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 Due to incredible socioeconomic stratification of society in the context of extreme 
demographic and regional diversity, regionalism has been a crucial political issue for Nepal 
during the recent democratic transition. The traditional power elite belonging to hill “high caste” 
groups are trying to maintain the centralized power structure to protect their own interests. On 
the other hand, various ethnic and regional identity groups, who have fought for autonomy and 
self-rule, want their identity and rights to be recognized. Despite the promulgation of the federal 
constitution by the Constitutional Assembly in 2015, many ethnic and regional identity groups 
have expressed their opposition for the restructuring of the state based on territorial principle 
which ignores their identity.  
Despite the historical struggle of ethnic and regional groups, this research shows a 
significant section of the voters belonging to these groups are divided on the federal question. 
There is lack of internal cohesion, communication and solidarity within and across many of the 
identity groups, despite the prediction of such cohesion by the existing theories of regionalism. 
Scholars of regionalism assume that economic and social differences automatically produce 
ethnic mobilization and regionalism. The case of Nepal shows that such assumption is not 
always true as we do not find the extent of support for ethnic federalism prescribed by various 
theories of regionalism.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Bahun  “High-caste” group from the hill region traditionally engaged in performing 
Hindu rituals and promotion of learning, following strict rules for food, drinking 
and marriage   
Chherti  “high-caste” group from the hills, traditionally engaged in military and governing  
Dalit  The so called “low-caste” group in Hindu society, who live scattered across the 
country. This group is also divided by an internal caste system; and are 
traditionally engaged in different trades such as iron work (Kami), leather work 
(Sarki), tailoring (Damai), and goldsmiths (Sunar).  
Gorkha One of the principalities in central hills of Nepal, which initiated a military 
campaign to unite the country in 1776 
ILO-169 ILO Convention on the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights, 1989.  
Limbu  Ethnic group, living in the far eastern hills  
Madhesi  Caste groups living in Eastern Terai, who claim that all people living there are 
Madhesi 
Magar  Ethnic group, living in western hills  
NC  Nepali Congress, center right party  
NEFIN  Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities, umbrella organization representing 
ethnic groups of Nepal, established in 2002 
Newar  Ethnic group living mostly in the Kathmandu valley, also known as Newa 
PEON “Permanent Establishment of Nepal”, or the elite groups of military top brass, 
merchants, mendicants, mandarins and mediators (contractors) also known as M5 
who traditionally control state power in Nepal  
Rai  Ethnic group living in the eastern hills  
RPP Rastriya Prajantra Party, the far-right monarchist party, advocating for centralized 
Hindu state and restoration of monarchy  
Sugauli Place in northern India, where the British-Nepal Treaty was signed in 1816. This 
treaty is known as Sugauli (or Sugoli) Treaty.  
Tamang  Ethnic group, living in the central hills of Nepal around the Kathmandu valley  
Terai  Low lands in southern part of Nepal bordering India, sometimes also called as 
Madhesh. It stretches from east to west of the country.  
Tharu  Tribal Groups living in the Terai, who claim that they are not Madhesi and have 
separate identity  
UCPN(M) United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) also known as Maoists, which have 
now split into various outfits  
UML  United Marxists Leninists, Centre Left party in Nepal  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
Nepal has been selected for the current research because it is a country with incredible 
socioeconomic stratification along with extreme diversity in demography and culture. Due to 
such diversity, the question of ethnic and regional identity has become a prominent political 
issue over the past decade as the country undertook the task of federal restructuring. The case of 
Nepal is still more interesting because there is a proportional electoral system (along with ‘first 
past the post’ system), which was introduced to encourage participation of even smaller regional 
or ethnic identity groups. In spite of this, the ethnic and regional groups are divided in their 
preferences regarding the federal question, due to which the dominant groups have benefitted in 
maintaining their traditional power. How can we explain the federal question in Nepal? How 
does the Nepal case stand in relation to the existing theories of regionalism? This research is 
directed to find the answers to these important questions.  
 
Figure - 1: Demographic Map of Nepal1 
                                                          
1 University of Texas, Austin. 2016. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/nepal_ethnic_80.jpg  
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In order to understand the context of regionalism in Nepal, we need to look into the key 
moments in its modern history as well as its socio-economic structure. In this chapter, I will give 
a brief outline of the modern history of Nepal, which is important to understand the nature of 
regionalism in the country. The socioeconomic structure will be discussed in a later chapter 
(Chapter 3).   
a). Brief History of Modern Nepal 
Nepal is a country located on the southern slopes of the Himalayas. It is a landlocked 
country bordering China’s Tibet region in the north, and India in the south, east and west. The 
landscape varies from plain land in the south called the Terai-Madhesh; moderate hilly region in 
the middle; and the high Himalayan mountainous region in the north. The country has a total 
population of 26.5 million and is inhabited by people of Tibeto-Burmese, Aryan and local Tribal 
origins, with 126 ethnic groups and indigenous nationalities, speaking 123 languages2.   
The country came into existence in the second half of 18th century when Prithvi Narayan 
Shah, one of the kings of the Gorkha principality in the central hills, initiated a military 
campaign against other principalities and established a unitary state3. As the king belonged to the 
“high-caste” group from the hill region, he established a state where the religion, culture and 
language of the ruling caste achieved dominant position.   
The control of the state by the “high-caste” group led to their political, economic and 
cultural domination over the country which marginalized the other ethnic and regional groups. 
Some ethnic groups like the Limbu in the Far East, who protested against the Gorkha rule, were 
later pacified by giving them limited autonomy. Keeping in mind the expanding British 
                                                          
2 Government of Nepal, Central Bureau of Statistics. “Population Monograph of Nepal” Vol-II, 2014.  
3 In 1769, King Prithvi conquered Kathmandu valley (which was known as “Nepa” in the local Newari language) and 
established Gorkha Kingdom there. The name of the country was later changed to “Nepal”, possibly to appease the 
local ethnic Newari population, who were unhappy with the military occupation by the King of Gorkha.  
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colonization of the plains in neighboring India, the newly established state was more interested 
in consolidation of its power through security of its borders and collection of taxes. The state 
recruited officers for government jobs from the dominant group. At the local level, however, it 
allowed the ethnic and regional groups to practice their religious and cultural traditions4 and tried 
to harmonize the situation for the maintenance of the new regime5. After the Anglo-Gurkha War 
of 1814-16, Nepal lost one-third of its territory in the south, east and west. The Treaty of Sugolee 
(1816)6 allowed the British to recruit the men from the hill ethnic groups into the British Army.  
In 1846, one of the military generals belonging to the Rana clan, captured power through 
a military coup and established hereditary rule of Rana Prime Ministers that lasted for about a 
century (1846-1950). The Ranas gave the king a ceremonial role, and did not allow education or 
development in the country. They kept the country in complete isolation from the outside world 
by prohibiting foreigners from visiting the country. As the Ranas made a lot of enemies among 
the ruling clans, they established close ties with the British rulers in India for the survival of their 
regime. They allowed the Indian businessmen to come to Nepal to trade which gradually ended 
the trade monopoly of the local ethnic Newars of Kathmandu. The Ranas continued the same 
policy as the Shah Kings vis-à-vis the ethnic and regional groups.  
The popular uprising of 1950, however, ended the Rana rule and established democracy 
for the first time leading the country towards modernization. But, Nepal’s first tryst with 
democracy was short-lived. Threatened by the mobilization of the diverse groups in the 
democratic process, the ruling classes (landlords and courtiers belonging to the Shah and Rana 
                                                          
4 Prithvi Narayan, the founder of Nepal had understood the importance of making peace with the diverse caste and 
non-caste ethnic groups for the stability of his regime and had said that “Nepal is a garden of 4 castes and 36 
ethnicities”.  
5 The ethnic Newars of Kathmandu Valley had exclusive trade rights with Tibet, and the king of Gorkha allowed 
them to continue the trade and did not allow the merchants from India taking it over.  
6 The Treaty of Sugauli, Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Sugauli  
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clans) conspired against democracy. Taking advantage of the post-democratic chaos of 1950s, 
the king took power through a military coup in 1960 and established a “party-less” Panchayat7 
system. 
During the period of 1960-1990, the country took the path towards modernization but 
under the autocratic rule of the monarchy. The monarchy started the hill “high” caste oriented 
nationalist campaign of homogenization (“Nepalization”), by claiming that Nepal is a country 
with “one ethnicity, one language, one dress and one nation”.  
However, the popular uprising of 1990 ended the autocratic Panchayat system and 
established constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy. The new regime provided 
political space for the ethnic groups to participate in the political process. But the ruling elites 
were able to maintain the status of “Hindu state” in the new constitution and rejected demands 
for a secular state, regional autonomy and identity based representation.  
Again, in 2005, at the height of Maoist civil war (1996-2006), the king took over power 
with the help of the military, curtailed political rights and jailed political leaders. The second 
popular movement against the monarchy took place in 2006, and was successful in restoring 
democracy. This time, the elected constitutional assembly abolished the monarchy in 2008, 
declared Nepal as a secular, federal democratic republic, and established the principles of 
proportional representation for all ethnic and regional groups in the state structures.  
In spite of these achievements, the political actors representing traditional political forces 
and the emerging regional and ethnic identity groups strongly differed on the principles and 
goals of restructuring of the state. The traditional political elites advocated for non-ethnic 
                                                          
7 The Panchayats were the informal village assemblies of local elites, who traditionally used to settle local disputes 
in the villages. The new regime formalized these Panchayats by introducing elections, but these Panchayats were 
just an embellishments and a cover for the autocratic rule of the Monarchy.  
5 
 
 
 
territorial division, whereas the elites of the emerging identity groups demanded ethnic and 
identity based restructuring. Although the 2nd Constitutional Assembly in 2015 adopted a 
constitution based on non-ethnic restructuring8, the elites of the identity groups were not satisfied 
with the provisions in the constitution, and their campaign for the revision of the constitution is 
on-going.  
b). The research topic and its relevance 
Although Nepal has been a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic country, the traditional ruling 
elites have suppressed the ethnic and regional groups and ruled the country throughout most of 
its modern history by establishing a centralized unitary state. Every time Nepal’s democratic 
political forces attempted to institutionalize the rights of the diverse ethnic and regional groups 
through a democratic and secular constitution, the traditional hill “high caste” Hindu elite (also 
labeled as the permanent establishment of Nepal – PEON9), who have entrenched themselves in 
the state structures, have suppressed the demands of the regional identity groups in order to 
safeguard their political and economic interests. Therefore, the inclusion and rights of diverse 
ethnic, regional and minority groups have been a crucial political issue over the past six decades.   
The traditional ruling elite do not want to lose their power, but the hitherto oppressed 
ethnic, linguistic, regional groups want recognition of their identity through equitable 
representation and devolution of power. To achieve this goal, the identity groups have been 
demanding the restructuring the traditional unitary state and the establishment of federal units 
based on ethnicity and regional identity. The question of regionalism in Nepal is so critical that 
the first constituent assembly (2008-12) was unsuccessful in drafting a new federal constitution. 
                                                          
8 The Constitution of Nepal, 2015. http://www.nepalembassy-germany.com/pdfs/Constitution_full_english.pdf  
9 One renowned political analyst, CK Lal, has defined the PEON of Nepal as 5-M: military top brass, mandarins, 
merchants, mendicants and mediators (contractors). See CK Lal, “The Conservative Consolidation”, The Republica, 
August 13, 2016. http://admin.myrepublica.com/opinion/story/25232/the-conservative-consolidation.html  
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The second constituent assembly (2013) finally adopted the constitution in 2015 by deciding to 
have seven federal states based on non-ethnic principle, although this decision was not accepted 
by the identity groups who have continued their struggle by demanding revision of the federal 
structure.  
The continued political instability even after the adoption of the new constitution 
indicates that the issue of identity and regionalism in Nepal has not been adequately addressed 
by political actors. Therefore, the study of the issues of ethnic, linguistic, caste, religious and 
regional identities in Nepal and their necessary resolution for national integration has acquired 
not only academic but also practical political significance.  
The key tasks of this research are to 1) assess the extent to which ordinary voters and 
political party preferences regarding the federal question varied during the recent election; 2) 
estimate the level of unity of preferences between ethnic voters and political parties representing 
them; and 3) make recommendations for the solution of the federal question in Nepal.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES OF REGIONALISM  
 
Regionalism is a political theory that examines the interests and political aspirations of 
group(s) of people living in a particular region of a country who may feel that they have been 
marginalized by the central state based on ethnicity, language or culture and want to have access 
to power and resources through decentralization, autonomy, or secession from the state. The 
theory of regionalism is relatively new. Scholars have been studying this question especially 
after the end of WWII that led to the creation of new states following decolonization. As many 
national and regional groups around the world started claiming their political rights, the United 
Nations adopted the principle of “national self-determination” (UN Charter) and the “rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples” (ILO Convention 169).  
In order to study the regional question in Nepal, I have used various theories of 
regionalism, including Dependency Theory, Internal Colonialism, Primordialism, theory of 
Social Communication, and Institutional Theory.  
Dependency Theory was developed in the 1950s which tried to explain the structural 
relation of dependency between the developed “core” and the backward “periphery” which was 
thought to lead to the rise of nationalist, regionalist and secessionist movements in developing 
countries (Rokkan, Urwin, 1982). Based on the Dependency theory, Internal Colonialism 
suggested that economic exploitation and cultural domination by the Centre helps strengthen 
identities in cultural regions as a response to it (Hechter, 1975). Hechter also claimed that the 
process of industrialization increases economic inequality between the center and regions and the 
resulting unequal industrial development creates dependency of the periphery on the center. He 
also claimed that the dominant Centre will use its administrative policies and structures to 
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institutionalize the existing stratification in the periphery in order to reinforce its dominant 
position (Hecter, 1975, page 9). If Hechter’s theory is true, then it means that the allegedly 
internal colonial approach of the center creates strong internal unity in the different social strata 
in the periphery, and generates loyalty and commitment of the masses to their own 
ethnic/regional political leadership to fight the domination of the center.  
Samuel Huntington (1968) argued that democratic transition in the emerging multi-ethnic 
societies of states that gained independence after WW II could be destabilizing as these states 
might not be able to balance political development with modernization pressures due to a lack of 
institutions. He claimed that transition from autocratic rule to democracy will liberate hitherto 
oppressed groups and enable them to participate in the political process. However, as these new 
groups do not find institutional space for participation and for sharing of power, these groups 
become alienated form the political process leading to conflict in the society. In this research, 
analysis has been made how far the alienation of the new groups by the state affected the 
preferences of the masses of the regional identity groups towards making a unified response 
against the dominant elites who control the state.  
Clifford Geertz (1973) proposed the concept of Primordialism to explain the continued 
relevance of nationalism and regionalism in new states. He believed that group identity emerges 
naturally as a result of very long period of cohabitation of group members who are linked 
through common history, language, culture, kinship, religion, region etc. and these bonds 
coalesce to form primordial identities. If Geertz’s theory is true, we shall see a strong correlation 
between the demands of the ethnic and regional parties with the individual preferences of the 
voters during elections.  
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Karl Deutsch (1953) argued that Social Communication affects the extent of regionalism. 
Deutsch believed that social communication plays a prominent role in the formation of 
nationalities during the transition of societies to modernity. He claimed that the process of 
modernization increases social mobilization and communication within the marginalized groups. 
Deutsch argued that members of the marginalized group communicate more effectively and 
intensely with individuals within the group than those from the outside, which could reinforce 
regional and national identities. He also suggests that states can in some instances build ties 
across ethnic groups through the flow of standardized information (“standard stream”) in order to 
assimilate those groups into the dominant culture. The ethnic groups will also have the “peculiar 
stream” of information from the past experiences of their community. The interaction between 
standard stream and peculiar stream will generate a “feedback stream” as a response of the group 
to the assimilation efforts of the state through the standard stream. Deutsch concludes that 
assimilation or dissimilation of the ethnic group will depend on whether the “standard stream” or 
“feedback stream” gets the upper hand (Karl Deutsch, page 91-92).  
In Nepal, since 1990s, various forms of communication have been developed. If 
Deutsch’s theory is true, then we shall see how far the increased opportunities for 
communication contributed to generate common preferences among the marginalized groups and 
their political parties on the federal question10. We can also measure the extent of national or 
regional mobilization as an indicator of the processes of assimilation or dissimilation taking 
place among the diverse ethnic and regional groups in Nepal.  
                                                          
10 Experts believe that development of the media in Nepal is one of the major achievement of the democratic 
process of recent years. Along with the vast number of newspapers and TV channels, community radios are 
proliferating in the country. There are above 200 local FM radios spread across 74 out of 75 districts. For more, see 
Association of Community Radio Broadcasters Nepal. 2016. 
http://www.acorab.org.np/index.php?pagename=aboutus   
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CHAPTER 3 
REGIONAL STRUCTURE OF NEPAL   
a). Nepal’s Demographic Structure 
  
Figure - 2: Ethnographic Map of Nepal11 
 
Nepal’s demography is extremely diverse. The population can be divided broadly into two 
groups: caste groups and non-caste (ethnic) groups. Caste groups belong to the Hindu system of 
social hierarchy, where Brahmins and Chhetri occupy dominant positions; and Dalits are the 
“low caste” who are also known as the “untouchables”. On the other hand, there are about 100 
non-caste ethnic groups with native areas in certain regions of the country. (See Map-2 above). 
                                                          
11 Mark Turin, “Harka’s Maps”. Nepali Times, 26 Jan 2007. http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=13160# 
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Having said that, there is no region in the country where a single ethnic or regional identity 
group that has a majority of the population. A breakdown of the population of the country, as 
provided by the 2011 National Census12, is given in Table-1.  
Table-1: Population of Major Ethnic and Caste Groups 
Group # Population  % 
1. “High-Caste” Hill people (Bahun, Chhetri) 4 8,278,401 31.2 
2. Indigenous Nationalities (non-caste) 67  35.3 
 Mountain  50 7,228,463 27.3 
 Terai-Madhes (Tharus)* 13 2,039,407 7.7 
 Others ethnicities  4 91,852 0.3 
3. Dalits (“low caste”) 20  12.6 
 Hill  5 2,151,526 8.1 
 Madhesi Dalit* 15 1192,517 4.5 
4. Madhesi (Regional Identity groups)   15.3 
 Caste Madhesi 34 4072323 15.3 
5. Muslims* (Religious identity group) 3 1,164,255 4.4 
6. Unidentified   275,670 1.0 
Total   26,494,504 100 
 
As the table shows, the dominant hill “high-caste” group, consists of Bahun and Chhetris, 
who account for 31.2% of the population. The indigenous nationalities account for 35.3%, Dalits 
– 12.6%, Madhesi 15.3% and Muslims – 4.4%. The Madhesi group claim that the Tharus and 
Muslims, who live also in the southern Terai belt, are also Madhesi. But both the Tharus and 
Muslims have rejected that claim and believe that their identity is separate from that of the 
Madhesi. Ten major caste and non-caste groups in Nepal are given in the table below.   
 
  
                                                          
12 Government of Nepal, Central Bureau of Statistics. “Population Monograph of Nepal, 2014”.  
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Table-2: Ten major Caste Groups in Nepal13 
Caste or Ethnicity Total Population % Location 
Chhetri  4,398,053 16.6% Scattered, mostly in Mid & Far West 
Bahun  3,226,903 12.2% Scattered  
Magar  1,887,733  7.1% Western and Mid-western Hills  
Tharu  1,737,470  6.6% Terai region 
Tamang  1,539,830  5.8% Central Hills  
Newar  1,321,933  5.0% Kathmandu valley  
Kami  1,258,554  4.8% Scattered  
Muslim  1,164,255  4.4% Mostly in Terai, scattered  
Yadav  1,054,458  4.0% Eastern Terai  
Rai  620,004  2.3% Eastern hills  
 
According to the National Census of 2011, 123 different languages are spoken in the 
country as mother tongue. Nepali, the official language, is spoken by 44.6% of the population. 
Maithili, the second largest language, is mostly spoken in the Eastern Terai. Ten most spoken 
languages in Nepal along with population and locations are given in the table below.  
Table-3: Major languages spoken in Nepal14 
Language  Total population  Percentage  Locations  
Nepali 11,826,953 44.6 Across the country  
Maithili  3,092,530 11.7 Eastern Terai  
Bhojpuri  1,584,958 6.0 Mid Terai  
Tharu  1,529,875 5.8 Throughout Terai  
Tamang  1,353,311 5.1 Central hills  
Newar  846,557 3.2 Kathmandu valley  
Bajjika  793,418 3.0 Eastern Terai  
Magar  788,530 3.0 Western hills  
Doteli  787,827 3.0 Far western hills  
Urdu  691,546 2.6 Terai  
 
 
                                                          
13 UNDP, 2014. The Federalism Debate in Nepal. Page 64 
http://www.np.undp.org/content/dam/nepal/docs/projects/UNDP_NP_SPCBN_the-federalism-debate-in-
nepal.pdf  
14 UNDP, ibid.  
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b). Nepal’s Economic Structure: 
The hill “high-caste” dominated unitary state created extreme economic disparity among 
the caste and non-caste groups over the past two and half centuries, which is reflected in a report 
prepared by the UN in Nepal (Human Development Report, UNDP, 2014). The report says that 
Human Development Index (HDI) of Brahmins and Chhetris rank at the top (0.538), whereas 
Ethnicities, Dalits, and Muslims have HDI values of 0.482, 0.434 and 0.422 respectively15. The 
report also found that “(a)mong identified castes and ethnic groups, Hill Brahmans have the 
highest HDI score at 0.557, and the Madhesi Dalits have the lowest. The Muslims and Dalits 
have HDI values 27 and 24 percent lower respectively than that of the Brahmans/Chhetris”16. 
(See Exibit-1 for details of the figures).  
 
Figure -3: Per-capita Income across Demographic Groups and Regions17 
                                                          
15 UNDP Human Development Report 2014, page 17 
16 UNDP Human Development Report, 2014. Page 17-18 
17 Figure based on data from UNDP, 2014 Human Development Report, page 96-99. See also Exhibit-1 for details of 
the data.  
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Nepal Living Standards Survey of 2010/2011 also found that there is a clear relation 
between levels of income with caste and ethnicity. The survey showed that “Brahmans/Chhetris 
have the highest income per capita, followed by the Janajati (ethnicities) and the Dalit. The per 
capita income of Hill Brahman is 1.7 times higher than that of the Dalit in general, and two times 
higher than that of the Madhesi Dalit”18. (See Figure -3 & 4 and Table in Exhibit - 1&2).  
 
Figure -4: Economic Disparity Across Regions19 
If we compare the life expectancy among the different groups, we see that Bahun and 
Chhetri have the highest and Dalits have the lowest. Literacy rate is highest among Bahun 
Chherti and lowest among Muslims. (See Figure-5 & Exhibit – 1).  
 
 
 
                                                          
18 UNDP, 2014, page 18 
19 Figure drawn by using data from UNDP, 2014, page 96-99 
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Figure – 5: Life Expectancy and Adult Literacy among Groups and Regions20 
Although Nepal is traditionally an agricultural country, the industrialization process 
started in the 1960s and now industry contributes about 15% of the GDP21. Industries are more 
and more being concentrated in the ‘periphery’ (mostly in the Eastern Terai) which is reflected 
by the industrial employment data. (See Figure – 6 below and Exhibit – 3).  
The territorial structure of industrialization also shows that most of Nepal’s industries 
(food processing, jute mills, sugar mills, tobacco, tea processing etc.) are located in the eastern 
Terai. The Terai in general heavily contributes to the country’s national income (GDP)22, 
whereas the mid and far western hills and the mountain regions are dependent on allocation from 
the center.  
                                                          
20 Figure drawn based on data from UNDP, 2014. Page 96-99 
21 Statista.com http://www.statista.com/statistics/425750/nepal-gdp-distribution-across-economic-sectors/  
22 Gaige, 1975 
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Figure -6: Industrial Employment in Different Regions23 
The structural analysis shows that there is significant economic and human development 
disparity among the regions of Nepal, where the central hills have a higher level of development 
but the other regions, especially the Terai are left behind. Similarly, we can see that there is 
disparity among the ethnic and regional groups, where the traditional elite (Bahun and Chhetri) 
have a higher status in terms of income, whereas other ethnicities and regional groups are 
significantly behind.   
The Dependency / Internal Colonialism theories claim that the state concentrates 
industries at the Centre and exploits the periphery by making the latter as a base for raw 
materials. In Nepal’s case, however, the state has supported the establishment of major industries 
in the periphery (eastern Terai-Madhes), thereby making the Centre dependent on the periphery 
for industrial production.  
                                                          
23 UNDP, 2014, page 116. Also see Exhibit-3 for details of the figures.  
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS   
a). Research Methodology: 
Guided by the theoretical propositions mentioned above, I use a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Qualitative data regarding the preferences of national and regional political 
parties on the federal question has been obtained from their election manifestoes and also from 
media sources. On the other hand, quantitative data such as 1) votes received by major political 
parties in the 2013 national elections, 2) demography and 3) economic data of the 75 districts has 
been used. Regression analyses have been carried out by taking the percentage of votes received 
by political parties at the district level as dependent variable; and voter turnout, economic and 
demographic data of those districts as independent variables.  
Although the election in 2013 was for a new constitution, and, as the main agenda of the 
constitutional assembly was to decide on the federal restructuring, an assumption has been made 
that the votes cast reflected the preferences of the voters on the issue of restructuring of the state; 
and that the party votes represent the level of support of voters to the state restructuring agenda 
proposed by the political parties. The votes received by the political parties24 on the proportional 
system has been used as it better reflects voter preference in support of the manifesto of the 
parties25.  Due to the extreme diversity of population groups, demographic data of four major 
caste or non-caste groups from each of the 75 districts, provided by the 2011 National Census, 
has been used. Data on per capita income has been taken from UNDP 2014 Human Development 
                                                          
24 The 2013 National Election data were received from the Nepal Election commission website. 
http://election.gov.np/CA2070/CAResults/reportBody.php?selectedMenu1=2&rand=1472227323  
25 The assumption here is that the FPTP system will be biased for this research as voters in Nepal cast their votes 
based on various other factors like kinship (nepotism), existing contacts, access to the candidate etc. Hence FPTP 
votes have not been considered for this research.  
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Report, whereas data on government revenue and total budget allocation to the districts has been 
taken from the Consolidated Financial Statement26 of the Government of Nepal for the Fiscal 
Year 2011/12.  
b). Data analysis 
In order to assess voter preferences regarding the restructuring agenda of regional and 
national political parties, I conducted regression analysis to evaluate 13 different Models: 4 
models for national political parties (NC, UML, Maoist and RPP); 8 models for regional parties 
representing identity groups; and 1 model for ‘other’ minor parties. The party votes at the district 
level are taken as the dependent variable reflecting voters’ preferences towards the agenda of the 
political party on federal question. The independent variables are the percentages of the 
population of four major demographic groups of each district, voter turnout, per capita income, 
per capita government revenue and budget allocation in each of the 75 districts. While carrying 
out the regressions, I excluded the dominant groups like Bahun and Chherti, as these groups are 
generally considered having preferences in favor of the traditional unitary state27.  
Findings of the regressions, together with coefficients, standard errors and coefficient of 
determination (R^2 adjusted), have been given in the page below. The results of the tests of the 
models are discussed in the next section.      
                                                          
26 Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal. 2011-12. Consolidated Financial Statements. 
http://www.fcgo.gov.np/wp-content/uploads/Fiscal-year-2011-12-2068-69.pdf  
27 A separate regression for the joint vote of NC and UML (NCUML) also shows that there is strong relation 
between Bahun and Chhetri population and the votes of these political parties. See Table-4 in next page.  
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Table 4- Regression Analysis: Coefficients and Standard Errors 
Variables  NC UML Maoist RPP Madhes Tharuha SLimbu SSPN Dalit Khamp Janamu Newa Others  
(Intercept) .37** 
(.17) 
.28 
(.19) 
.10 
(.19) 
.58 
(.11) 
-.03 
(.08) 
.01 
(.06) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(.01) 
00 
(.01) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
-.02 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.006) 
(.14 
.12) 
Turnout  .04 
(.23) 
.03 
(.26) 
.15 
(.25) 
-.12 
(.15) 
.04 
(.11) 
-.02 
(.08) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(.02) 
00 
(.01) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.02 
(.02) 
.01 
(.008) 
.02 
(.17) 
Percapita Income 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.001** 
(0.00) 
0.001*** 
(0.00) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(00) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
Percapita 
Revenue  
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(00) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0*** 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
Percapita Exp 0.0 
(0.0) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(00) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0** 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
Limbu  -.16 
(.10) 
.06 
(.12) 
.03 
(.11) 
0.0 
(.07) 
-.02 
(.05) 
-.02 
(.03) 
.01*** 
(.003) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
00 
(00) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(.01) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.03 
(.07) 
Sherpa  .36 
(.40) 
-.22 
(.45) 
.61 
(.43) 
-.57** 
(.26) 
-.03 
(.20) 
-.07 
(.14) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.28*** 
(.03) 
00 
(.02) 
-.001 
(.003) 
00 
(.05) 
00 
(.01) 
.27 
(.28) 
Rai -.15 
(.13) 
.13 
(.15) 
0.00 
(.14) 
-.08 
(.09) 
-.01 
(.06) 
-.04 
(.05) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.21*** 
(.01) 
00 
(.01) 
00 
(.001) 
00 
(.01) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(.09) 
Madhesi Tribal -.68 
(.63) 
.51 
(.72) 
.48 
(.68) 
.25 
(.42) 
.61* 
(.31) 
-.18 
(.23) 
-.003 
(.01) 
.12* 
(.06) 
-.03 
(.04) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
-.02 
(.07) 
00 
(.02) 
.01 
(.45) 
Tharu -.85* 
(.09) 
-.21* 
(.11) 
.13 
(.10) 
0.00 
(.06) 
.01 
(.04) 
.19*** 
(.03) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(.01) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.04 
(.07) 
Muslim -.57** 
(.24) 
-.17 
(.27) 
-.25 
(.26) 
.15 
(.16) 
.40*** 
(.12) 
.27*** 
(.08) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.01 
(.02) 
.04** 
(.01) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.02 
(.03) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.09 
(.17) 
Magar -.08 
(.07) 
-.27 
(.08) 
.22** 
(.08) 
-.07 
(.05) 
.00 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.02) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.02** 
(.009) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
-.02 
(.05) 
Tamang  -.16** 
(.07) 
.02 
(.08) 
.25*** 
(.08) 
.02 
(.05) 
-.02 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.02) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
-.008*** 
(.002) 
-.07 
(.05) 
Newar  -.23* 
(.13) 
-.27* 
(.15) 
0.00 
(.14) 
.20** 
(.09) 
-.02 
(.06) 
0.00 
(.04) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(.01) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.004) 
.29*** 
(.09) 
Madhesi -.41** 
(.16) 
-.50*** 
(.18) 
-.08 
(.17) 
-.06 
(.11) 
.73*** 
(.08) 
0.00 
(.06) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(.01) 
.02** 
(.01) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
-.02 
(.02) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.32 
(.11) 
Madhesi Dalit  .21 
(1.22) 
1.13 
(1.37) 
.71 
(1.31) 
.25 
(.81) 
-2.1*** 
(.60) 
.51 
(.44) 
-.001 
(.03) 
.01 
(.12) 
-.08 
(.08) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.06 
(.15) 
.009 
(.04) 
-.63*** 
(.87) 
Gurung  .03 
(.18) 
-.53 
(.20) 
.42** 
(.19) 
-.20* 
(.12) 
-.05 
(.09) 
-.05 
(.06) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(.01) 
00 
(.01) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(.02) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
-.07 
(.13) 
Hill Dalit  -.11 
(.08) 
.03 
(.09) 
-.01 
(.09) 
.03 
(.05) 
-.02 
(.04) 
00 
(.03) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
00 
(00) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
.09 
(.05) 
Thakali  -.52 
(.44) 
-.59 
(.49) 
-1.13** 
(.47) 
.18 
(.29) 
.02 
(.21) 
00 
(.15) 
00 
(.01) 
-.06 
(.04) 
00 
(.03) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.02 
(.01) 
1.65*** 
(.31) 
R^2 Adj. 0.30 0.275 0.269 0.510 0.813 0.530 .186 .851 0.291 -0.198 -0.157 0.812 0.445 
Standard errors are in brackets. Codes of Significance: *** => p = 0.01; ** => p = 0.05;   * => p = 0.10. 
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c). Findings and Discussion 
In this section, analysis has been made on the results obtained from the regression 
analysis by using various theories of regionalism: Institutional Theory, Internal Colonialism, 
Social Communication and Primordialism.  
Institutional theory claims that in modernizing societies, because of increased education 
and economic development, many oppressed groups strive to participate in the political process, 
but the system does not allow them to participate, and alienates them, thereby creating conflict in 
the society. Samuel Huntington (1968) has called this phenomenon as the ‘institutional gap’. 
This means that, as the traditional elites alienate the marginalized groups from the political 
mainstream; this alienation reinforces the identities of these groups and generates a common 
political preference in order to fight the discriminatory policies of the traditional dominant actors 
who control power of the state.  
One of the major caste group that has been discriminated in the Nepali society are the 
Dalits, who are treated as “untouchables” and do not have access to public places (e.g. places of 
worship), public services (e.g. education and healthcare) and are not adequately represented in 
the decision-making structures. The Dalits have their own political party (The Dalit Janajati 
Party is the major one). There are countless Dalit civil society organizations working throughout 
the country for raising awareness and educational status of Dalits and for empowering them to 
claim their rights.  
 If Huntington’s Institutional theory is valid, we should see a strong unity of preference of 
Dalit voters with the political party representing their political interests. However, this is not the 
case. The regression analysis shows no significant association between this party’s federal 
restructuring agenda (non-territorial Electoral College for Dalits) and the Dalit population both in 
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the hills and the Terai. This means that Dalits in Nepal (12.5% of the population) are divided in 
their preferences and do not support political party that was established to represent their 
interests. Instead of the Dalits, there appears to be some association between the Dalit Janajati 
Party preferences with the Muslims (coef=0.04, r^2=0.291) and a section of the Madhesi group 
(coef=0.02, r^2=0.291).  
The lack of Dalit support to their political party may be due to several reasons. First of 
all, the Dalit population is scattered across the country and their leaders are ideologically divided 
among the main political parties. Another reason is that Dalits are divided among themselves 
with their own internal caste system, and the lower caste Dalits do not support the “Dalit 
Brahmins” who have a dominant position in Dalit organizations. Dalits are also divided 
regionally, as the Dalits in the Terai see the hill Dalits belonging to the dominant hill people. As 
the Dalits speak the same language and practice the same religion as that of the dominant group, 
they have not been able to clearly articulate their identity and initiate a strong campaign. 
Therefore, we conclude that, political alienation of the hitherto marginalized group by the elite 
does not automatically create unity in the marginalized group, as claimed by Samuel 
Huntington’s Institutional Theory.  
Theory of Internal Colonialism of Michael Hechter (1975) claims that the state at the 
Centre creates economic and cultural dependency in the ‘periphery’ and reinforces separate 
identities in the regions as a response to the internal colonial policies and practices. Let us test 
this theory in the cases of Madhesi and Newari communities in Nepal.  
 Some groups in Terai-Madhesh claim that the state has practiced internal colonialism and 
has marginalized their community culturally and economically for a long time. The issue of 
Madhesh first came up in the 1950s when some local groups started demanding autonomy for the 
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region. Later, Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP), established in 1985, started advocating for the 
political rights of the Madhesi. However, the party split in 2003, and now consists of half a 
dozen outfits. In 2007, two other parties, namely, Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum (MJF) and Terai 
Madhesh Lokatantrik Party (TMLP) were established. However, MJF also split into several 
groups the following year. These different parties would-be representing the Madhesi community 
have demanded a single Madhesh province (or a maximum of two provinces) in the southern 
Terai region.  
Historically, the people of the Terai-Madhesh could not be integrated into the national 
“mainstream” due to various reasons. First of all, malaria was prevalent in the Terai, where 
people from the hills could not live. Secondly, there was a belt of dense forest at the foothills that 
separated the communities in the hill and Terai28. The people in the Terai did not speak Nepali, 
and therefore they faced difficulty in getting government jobs (Gaige, 1975). However, after the 
eradication of malaria in the 1950s, the government initiated resettlement schemes of hill people 
in the Terai.  
In the 1960s, the autocratic monarchy initiated the process of Nepalization by imposing 
Nepali language in the Terai to strengthen mono-ethnic nationalism. Citizenship became a key 
issue in the Terai as the royal government could not establish a fair and workable procedure to 
identify who was a Nepali citizen and who was Indian and failed to distribute citizenship 
certificates to the citizens in a systematic way. During the brief period of democracy in the 
1950s, the political parties worked as a “melting-pot” for the diverse groups of both the hill and 
the Terai. However, after the ban against political parties in 1960, the process of national 
integration became stalled.   
                                                          
28 This forest was perceived by the then rulers as a natural defense from any threat coming from the south (India), 
especially from the British.  
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If Michael Hechter’s theory of Internal Colonialism was valid, we should have seen 
strong unity of preferences among the various groups living in the Terai, which is not the case. 
There is association between the votes of a section of caste Madhesi, Muslims, and Madhesi 
Tribals with the agenda of the Madhesi parties, but other major groups like Tharus, and Dalits do 
not appear to prefer the Madhesi agenda. In fact, the Madhesi Dalit have a significant negative 
association with the preferences of the Madhesi parties. And the Tharus, who are considered as 
the indigenous population of the Terai, appear to have no association with the preferences of the 
Madhesi parties. If we see the actual voting patterns, in Dhanusha District, which is located at 
the very heart of the proposed Madhesh province, the Madhesi Parties jointly received 15% of 
the votes on the proportional system, whereas the national parties received 55%.  
Another group who claim of internal colonialism by the state is the Newar community 
who mostly live mostly in the Kathmandu valley. During the unification of the country in the 
second half of 18th century, the King of Gorkha had invaded the Newar kingdoms of the valley, 
and since then, some Newari groups think that the Gorkha (later named as Nepal) state has 
marginalized their community by suppressing their language, culture and identity. Having said 
that, the Newars are considered to be the third most powerful group in the country after Bahuns 
and Chhetris. The Nepa National Party is the largest party representing the Newar community, 
which has demanded an autonomous ethnic Newa State in the Kathmandu valley.  
The regression analysis shows some association of Newar voters with the Newa National 
Party. But, there is a significant association of the Newar community with the votes obtained by 
monarchist RPP and ‘other’ fringe parties, who oppose ethnicity based federalism. These results 
show that, in a stratified and demographically diverse society like Nepal, Hechter’s theory of 
Internal Colonialism is inadequate to explain the regional question.  
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Karl Deutsch has proposed a social communication theory, which claims that in the 
process of modernization, the increased mobilization and communication reinforces regional and 
national identities. He also claimed that the nature of communication (standard stream) from the 
state interacts with the historical ‘peculiar stream’ of the ethnic groups and creates a ‘feedback 
stream’ as a response to the state’s dominant communication (standard stream). He also claimed 
that the process of assimilation or dissimilation of the marginalized groups depends on which 
stream gets the upper hand: standard stream or feedback stream. Let us test this theory in the 
cases of the Limbu and Rai communities of eastern Nepal.  
The Limbu community is an ethnic group living in the far eastern hills of Nepal. This 
group is represented by the Federal Limbuwan State Council who has demanded an autonomous 
Limbuwan State in the nine districts of far eastern Nepal29. This party is one of the most active in 
political mobilization to claim identity rights for the Limbus. In this area, there is also a large 
community of Rai people, who have also demanded a separate homeland for themselves, a Kirat 
Province. Because of the overlapping territorial claims between these two groups, there is no 
clarity on a clear division of territory among them.  
According to the theory of Social Communication, we should expect a strong unity of 
political preferences within Rai and Limbu communities only if the communication takes place 
through the particular streams. However, the regression analysis shows a weak relation between 
the preferences of these communities with their political parties on the federal question. The 
association of the preferences of Limbu voters with the Limbuwan Party is very weak. Similarly, 
the association of the preferences of the Rai voters with their ethnic Khambuwan Party is also 
very weak (coef.=0.00, r^2=-0.198). Another regional party active in this region is the Federal 
                                                          
29 Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limbuwan  
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Socialist Party Nepal (SSPN). There appears to be some association of the Limbu and Rai voters 
with SSPN. If we see the actual voting patterns in the area, we see that in Ilam district (i.e. at the 
very heart of the proposed ethnic Limbuwan state), the largest regional party (SSPN) received 
only 7% of the proportional votes, whereas the national parties received 78% of the votes. The 
ethnic parties of the Limbus and Rais (Limbuwan and Khambuwan) received a negligible 
percent of the votes from their own ethnic communities. This indicates that the relation between 
SSPN and the Rai and Limbu voters may be due to historical reasons30 rather than the effect of 
social communication. If social communication had played a role here, we could have seen 
stronger association between the Khambuwan and Limbuwan parties with their ethnic 
constituencies. This also doesn’t look like the victory of the ‘dominant’ stream because the 
struggle of the local ethnic groups for their identity is also ongoing. This indicates that there is 
neither assimilation nor dissimilation of the ethnicities as prescribed by the theory of Social 
Communication. 
Clifford Geertz’s (1973) concept of Primordialism claims that group identity emerges 
naturally as a result of long period of cohabitation and the common experiences of language, 
culture, kinship, region etc. that consolidate bond between individuals. If Geertz’s theory is true, 
we shall see a strong correlation between the demands of the ethnic parties with the individual 
preferences of the voters during elections. We have tested this theory in the cases of the Tharus, 
and Magar communities in Nepal.  
The Tharus are considered as an indigenous group living throughout the Terai belt in the 
south of the country. They are tribal peoples of the Terai, who cleared the forests, cultivated the 
                                                          
30 SSPN is a new regional party formed by the breakaway faction of one of the major national parties. It is a new 
party and its credentials as the guardian of ethnic identity of the local groups is still early to judge. The votes it 
received could be from the former supporters of the national party (UML) to which the leaders of SSPN belonged.  
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land and moved from place to place. After the eradication of malaria in the Terai in 1950s, the 
Terai has become migration destination both from the hills in the north and from India to the 
south. Due to this migration, the Tharus lost their land to the migrants and slowly became 
marginalized in their own ancestral lands. On the other hand, the Magars are considered as the 
indigenous peoples of Nepal who live in the western hills of the country. 
Regression analysis on the preferences of these ‘primordial’ groups shows that there is 
some association between the preferences of the groups to the political parties who represent 
them. The Tharu have their political parties like the Tharuhat Party and the Madhesi Janaadhikar 
Forum Lokatantrik (MJFL). The key demand of this group is Tharuhat, an ethnic homeland for 
the Tharus in the Terai-Madhesh. There is association on the preferences of the Tharus with 
Tharu political parties. The reason for the association seems to be not the primordial bond, but 
external demographic pressure from the settlers – both from the hills and the Terai. Especially, 
there is deep distrust between the Madhesi and the Tharus, and the Tharus have rejected Madhesi 
claim that they are also Madhesi. The Tharus believe that if they become Madhesi, they will not 
only lose their identity, but also their land to the Madhesi. Therefore, the Tharu support to their 
political parties appears more like a reaction against the Madhesi attempt for their assimilation, 
rather than internal primordial bonds between the Tharus. Bardiya district in the mid-west is 
considered to have the highest population of the Tharus in the country (53%, as per census 
2011). However, in Bardiya, the national parties jointly received 77% of the votes, whereas the 
Tharu parties jointly received only 7% of the votes. These figures indicate that Tharu political 
preferences are divided ideologically favoring national political parties, rather than being united 
by the primordial bonds to claim their political rights.  
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The ethnic Magar community is represented by the Rastriya Janamukti Party which has 
demanded Magarat, a homeland for their ethnic group. The regression analysis shows weak 
association between the preferences of the Magars with the Rastriya Janamukti Party. However, 
there is stronger association of Magar preferences with the Maoist Party. This is because, the 
Maoist movement started in mid 1990s with their “base-area” in the proposed Magarat region of 
the western hills, due to which a section of the Magars became ideologically indoctrinated. 
Therefore, in the case of Magars, there is no conclusive evidence that primordial bond has 
caused unity of political preferences. Palpa district is considered as having the highest population 
of Magar ethnicity in the country (52%, as per census 2011). If we see the actual voting patterns 
here, the national parties jointly received 86% of the votes, whereas the Janamukti Party, the 
ethnic party of the Magars, received only 2.5% of the votes. This shows, that, like the Tharus, the 
Magars are also ideologically divided in their preferences and favor the national political parties, 
rather than being united in their preferences to translate their primordial ties into political capital 
to achieve the ethnic Magarat state.  
As a summary of the analysis of the regression on the models of preferences of the 
identity groups and the political parties, we see that voters of the ethnic group are generally 
divided in their political preferences regarding the federal question. From this analysis, we 
conclude that the ethnic and identity groups in Nepal are in general divided along the ideological 
lines of the national political parties and the existing theories such as Internal Colonialism, 
Social Communication, Primordialism and Institutional Theory cannot adequately explain the 
regional question in Nepal.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Nepal is a country with extreme socio-economic as well as demographic, cultural and 
regional diversity. Since the re-establishment of democracy after the second popular movement 
in 2006, there is ongoing debate regarding the federal question and granting political rights to the 
diverse ethnic and regional identity groups. Due to historical discrimination and marginalization 
of the identity groups, ethnic and regional movements are ongoing. At the same time, the 
political actors in the country are making efforts to find a long-lasting solution of this important 
question. Despite the discrimination and marginalization of the identity groups, the current 
research shows that, the preferences of voters from these groups on the federal question are 
divided along the ideological lines of the national political parties who oppose identity based 
federalism. Another important finding is that there is lack of coordination, communication and 
solidarity within the groups to fight the unitary state at the centre. How do the findings of this 
research stand with respect to the theories of regionalism?   
In order to explain the regional phenomenon of Nepal, we had started this research with 
the theoretical propositions of the Internal Colonialism, Primordialism, Institutional Theory, and 
theory of Social Communication. Let us use the findings of the research to test these theories for 
possible explanation of the regional question in Nepal.  
Samuel Huntington’s Institutional Theory (1968) claimed that democratic transition in 
multi-ethnic societies of emerging states could be destabilizing as the hitherto oppressed groups 
who come to the political arena do not find institutional space for participation, and get alienated 
from the political process, leading to conflict in the society. Dalits in Nepal are one of such 
marginalized groups, who have been traditionally discriminated and marginalized and are 
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waging a struggle to establish their political rights since the establishment of democracy in 1950. 
If the Institutional Theory was valid, we would have seen a strong unity and coordination among 
the Nepali Dalits to fight the non-secular unitary state, and their political preferences would have 
been in alignment with the Dalit Political parties who have been demanding dalit rights. This 
research, however, shows that, there is no unity of preferences between Dalit voters and the Dalit 
political parties, especially the Dalit Janajati Party. Despite of the very active Dalit civil society 
organizations in Nepal31 who are educating their community and advocating for Dalit rights, 
Dalit voters both in the Hills and in the Terai appear to be divided along the ideological lines of 
the national political parties, who oppose identity based federalism. Therefore, the Institutional 
Theory cannot adequately explain the federal question in Nepal. 
Michael Hechter’s theory of Internal Colonialism (1975) suggested that economic 
exploitation and socio-cultural domination by the Centre creates dependency of the periphery on 
the centre, and strengthens regional identities in the periphery. In Nepal’s case, some of the 
ethnic and regional identity groups, namely the Madhesi and the Newari groups, claim that the 
state has used internal colonial approach in relation to them, and therefore, their demand for 
identity based federalism should be honored. If Hechter’s Theory of Internal Colonialism was 
valid, we would have seen a strong unity of preferences among Madhesi and Newari groups with 
their regional and ethnic political parties. But we do not see any such unity of preferences among 
voters of these groups. Especially in the Terai-Madhesh, we see that significant local groups like 
the Tharus, and Madhesi Dalits do not appear to prefer the regional identity claims of the 
Madhesi parties. In fact, there is a negative association between the Madhesi Dalit and the 
preferences of the Madhesi parties, which is against the claims of the theory of Internal 
                                                          
31 See Dalit NGO Federation in Nepal, http://www.dnfnepal.org/  
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Colonialism. Similarly, in the Newari case, there appears to be a stronger association with the 
monarchist RPP that prefers unitary state rather than with the ethnic party of the Newars. 
Therefore, in the context of Nepal, where there is extreme diversity and stratification of society, 
Hechter’s theory (Internal Colonialism) is inadequate to explain the regional question. 
Karl Deutsch’s (1953) theory of Social Communication claimed that modernization leads 
to social mobilization and communication within the marginalized groups and reinforces 
regional and national identities in them. This theory also asserted that the process of 
communication flowing from the state to these groups can create assimilation or dissimilation 
depending on whether the ‘standard stream’ or the ‘feedback stream’ gets the upper hand. I have 
tested this theory on the preferences of the ethnicities in Nepal.  
The Limbu ethnic group in far eastern hills is one of the most active ethnic movements in 
the country. However, this research shows that, the association of preferences of the Limbu 
voters with their political party (Federal Limbuwan State Council) is very weak. There appears 
to be some association between the preferences of the Rai and Limbu with the SSPN, a new 
regional party. However, SSPN is a new party formed by the breakaway faction of one of the 
national parties (UML) and it is early to judge how far this party will be committed to the 
demands of ethnicity based federalism. Despite the association of a section of ethnic voters to 
SSPN, national parties opposing ethnic federalism received absolute majority of votes in those 
districts, which shows that the Rais and Limbus are also ideologically divided rather than united 
as prescribed by the theory of social communication.  
Far eastern Nepal is also relatively developed in terms of education and communication. 
There are 15 local FM radios in the area32, not to speak of numerous other local or national 
                                                          
32 Asiawaves, 2010. http://www.asiawaves.net/nepal-radio.htm 
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electronic and print media. In spite of these mediums of communication, we see neither 
assimilation nor dissimilation of the Limbus or the Rais through the processes of ‘standard’ and 
‘feedback’ streams. The process of Social Communication has not created strong solidarity 
among ethnic voters in support of the preferences of their ethnic political parties.  
Clifford Geertz’s (1973) concept of Primordialism is also used to explain regional 
phenomena. This theory claims that common experiences of history, language, culture, kinship, 
region, beliefs etc. lead to primordial identities. In Nepal, there are various groups who claim to 
be primordial to the land. The Magar33 and the Tharu are such groups. This research shows that, 
there is some association of the Tharus with the political preferences of their political parties, but 
this seems to be due to external factors (pressure from the Madhesi for assimilation) rather than 
internal primordial bonds. On the other hand, there appears to be no coordination between the 
parties claiming to champion the rights of the Tharus, namely, the MJFL and the Tharuhat as 
these party fought elections against one another in the same constituencies. The Tharuhat Party 
has taken a stronger line in the demand for ethnic state, but the MJFL seems to be vacillating34 
and has seldom shown opportunistic behavior.  
In the case of Magars, the association of their political preferences with their ethnic party 
is very weak, but the association with the Maoist party is very strong. This appears to be due to 
ideological indoctrination of the Magars, as the area used to be the “base-area” of the Maoists 
during their military campaign. Therefore, Geertz’s concept of Primordialism is unable to 
explain the political behavior among identity groups of Nepal.   
                                                          
33 Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magars  
34 The MJFL sometimes allies with regional parties and other times with the national parties, hence its commitment 
to the federal question is doubtful.  
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From the above analysis, it is clear that the existing theories of regionalism cannot 
adequately explain the regional question in Nepal, which leads us to the question of the 
peculiarities of the electoral system for possible answers. In Nepal, there’s a mixed system of 
voting: the first past the post (FPTP) and the proportional system. Proportional voting was 
introduced in 2008 to encourage the participation of even smaller ethnic and regional groups in 
the structures of the state. Despite this, voters of regional and ethnic identity groups have 
preferred national political parties rather than their own ethnic and regional parties.  
If we look into the electoral system in neighboring India, there is no proportional 
electoral system, therefore, it is difficult to make a judgement of the regional question. But in 
Nepal, however, the proportional representation system gives a better measure of the regional 
aspiration of the voters. This makes the study of the regionalism in Nepal still more interesting 
and important. Despite the provision of the proportional representation system through which 
majority (335 out of 601) of the members of national parliament are elected, the voters of the 
ethnic and regional groups seem to be divided in their political preferences. This raises serious 
theoretical questions and challenges the scholars of regionalism to study the case of Nepal in 
order to develop new theories.  
The divided preferences of the identity groups have also protracted the process of Nepal’s 
democratic transition. Andre Lecours has rightly said that in a developing country like Nepal, 
restructuring of state can be a very difficult and protracted process due to extreme diversity, long 
history of autocratic regimes, fragile democracy vulnerable to external influence, (Lecours, 
2012)35. Neither the autocratic monarchy nor the liberal parties who came to power had 
visualized the need for federalization of the country. The federalization agenda came from the 
                                                          
35 Andre Lecours. 2012. Negotiating Federal Accommodation in a Multiethnic Society: The Case of Nepal. IPSA 
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_11126.pdf  
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opposition groups, who mobilized the ethnic and regional issues to achieve their own political 
objectives. Therefore, as Lecours says, Nepal is an “accidental federation” where liberal political 
parties were compelled to accept the federal agenda due to historical circumstances.   
Similarly, analyzing the Indian experience of federalization, Sunil Khilnani (1999) says 
that the Indian liberals who came to power after independence in 1947 focused on the group 
rights, instead of following on the prescriptions of their own liberal ideology (i.e. to focus on the 
universal rights of the individual). The focus on “group right” policy of India’s founding fathers 
led to benefit the elites of each of these identity groups, whereas the plight of the poor and 
disadvantaged in every identity group has remained the same even after 60 years of 
independence36. This gives us some indication that, in emerging new states, the rights of the 
identity groups should be accompanied with the universal rights of citizens so that the poor and 
marginalized within each group could also be brought into the mainstream and not only the elite 
of those groups. On the question of individual rights vs. the group rights, Clifford Geertz (1963), 
argues that the leaders of the emerging new states should adopt policies to reform the state in 
order to “domesticate primordial attachments” and “reconcile them with the unfolding civil 
order” and also by “neutralizing the apparatus of the state” in relation to the identity groups and 
also by “channeling discontent into properly political rather than para-political forms of 
expression”37  
Based on the findings of this research, I recommend that, for the national integration of 
Nepal, the ideas of Geertz on reforming the state and of Khilnani on fulfilling the universal rights 
                                                          
36 Sunil Khilnani, 1999. The Idea of India. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York.  
37 Clifford Geertz, 1963. The Integrative Revolution. Ed Old Societies and New States, The Free Press of Glencoe, 
London.  
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of citizens should go hand in hand. Having said that, I urge the scholars of political science to 
conduct more research on the “Nepal Puzzle” in order to enrich the theory of regionalism.   
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EXHIBITS  
 Exhibit (1): Economic disparity across identity groups (UNDP 2014, p 96-99) 
Caste/Ethnicity Life Expectancy  Adult Literacy  Per Capita Income  HDI Index  
Bahun Chherti  73.99 76.32 1115 0.538 
Madhesi  72.35 53.93 732 0.46 
Dalit  67.19 52.27 755 0.434 
Ethnic (Hill) 69.86 66.93 844 0.482 
Ethnic (Terai) 69.44 62.24 822 0.473 
Muslim 70.47 43.56 695 0.422 
All Hill  70.25 72.35 1056 0.511 
All Terai 70.95 53.27 744 0.454 
 
 Exhibit – (2): Economic Disparity Across Regions (UNDP, 2014, p. 96-99) 
Region  GNI per capita  Region  
GNI Per 
capita  
Region  GNI per 
capita  
All Nepal  1160 Eastern Mountain  1407 Eastern Terai  1047 
Eastern Region  1088 Central Mountain  1077 Central Terai  1045 
Central Region  1429 
Western 
Mountain  2329 
Western 
Terai  1097 
Western Region  1104 MW Mountain  811 
Midwest 
Terai  1117 
Midwest  906 FW Mountain  538 FW Terai  940 
Farwest  767 Eastern Hill  1107   
Mountain  965 Central Hill  1878   
Hill  1316 Western Hill  1100   
Terai  1052 MW Hill  745   
  FW Hill  643   
 
 Exhibit - (3): People Employed in Different Regions (UNDP 2014, p.116) 
Region  1997 2002 2007 
Kathmandu valley  99383 63993 38909 
Central Eastern Hills  9211 7492 8227 
Western Hills  5352 6175 6887 
MFW Hills  544 451 524 
Eastern Central Mountains  1383 802 537 
WMW, FW Mountains  70 53 125 
Eastern central Terai  59196 83832 92360 
Western Terai  12376 17589 18092 
MFW Terai  9993 11466 11889 
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